Martin Heidegger: revisiting transcendence

• Main Author: Natalia I. Ishchenko
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Law 2018-09-01
• Series: Антиномии
• Subjects: transcending; intentionality; phenomenology; ontology; hermeneutics; being; dasein; existence; understanding; temporality; ecstasy; husserl; heidegger
• ISSN: 2686-7206; 2686-925X

The subject of this article is Heidegger's existentially-ontological consideration of human being (Dasein) as the transcending structure. This article proves the conclusion that the interpretation of Heidegger's intentional consciousness as “transcendence” means going beyond Husserl's phenomenology. Consequently, raising an issue of intentionality as a specific kind of Being (rather than cognition) Heidegger in contrast with Husserl considers the latter not as the consciousness immanent act, but as the act of transcending, or ecstasis, which being “isomorphic to Husserl's structure of intention” is regarded as ontological (rather than epistemological or academic) phenomenon. Specifically, Heidegger regards the act of transcending as the ecstatic temporality, and, therefore, as the fundamental aprioristic structure of the human Being. Significantly, this ecstatic temporality corresponds to “«the horizon of understanding, which ontologically belongs to Dasein”. Furthermore, Heidegger characterizes the above-described structure as the “openness” (openness of things existent to Dasein and vice versa) and interprets it as the basic phenomenon, and as the initial research subject in his phenomenological ontology. Moreover, this structure of the human being has a twofold interpretation: as the Being of things existent (Dasein), or as the aprioristic condition of this Being, hence it “internally” grounds “the possibility of ontology” in principle.