Subjective Homophily and the Fixtures Problem
The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic p...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2020-02-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/1/11 |
| Summary: | The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed. |
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| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |