Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia

This study investigates earnings management of CEO changes in Indonesia. CEO change is classified either as routine or non-routine based on RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) and RUPSLB (Extraordinary General Shareholders Meeting) information. The samples are listed company undergoing CEO changes i...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Priskila Adiasih, Indra Wijaya Kusuma
Format: Article
Language:Indonesian
Published: Petra Christian University 2011-09-01
Series:Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
Subjects:
Online Access:http://puslit2.petra.ac.id/ejournal/index.php/aku/article/view/18458
id doaj-1353e69e57bf4751b4925a04f61f6aa2
record_format Article
spelling doaj-1353e69e57bf4751b4925a04f61f6aa22020-11-24T20:59:14ZindPetra Christian UniversityJurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan1411-02882011-09-011326779Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di IndonesiaPriskila AdiasihIndra Wijaya KusumaThis study investigates earnings management of CEO changes in Indonesia. CEO change is classified either as routine or non-routine based on RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) and RUPSLB (Extraordinary General Shareholders Meeting) information. The samples are listed company undergoing CEO changes in the Indonesian Stock Market observed from 2000 to 2009. To identify the earnings management practice, modified Jones model of discretionary accruals and Rowchordory’ of real earnings management are employed. The study provides evidence of non-routine incoming CEO undertaking earnings management by minimizing the earnings in the year of CEO change. The evidence shows that reporting minimum earnings is consistent with the notion of new CEO’s engagement in an ‘earnings bath’. However, this study does not support the theory of management compensation contracts during routine CEO changes. In addition, the incumbent CEO in the non-routine changes does not practice earnings management in the final year before the change. Therefore, manipulating earnings is not the argument to a non routine change of CEO.http://puslit2.petra.ac.id/ejournal/index.php/aku/article/view/18458Earnings managementdiscretionary accrualsroutine and non-routine CEO changes.
collection DOAJ
language Indonesian
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Priskila Adiasih
Indra Wijaya Kusuma
spellingShingle Priskila Adiasih
Indra Wijaya Kusuma
Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
Earnings management
discretionary accruals
routine and non-routine CEO changes.
author_facet Priskila Adiasih
Indra Wijaya Kusuma
author_sort Priskila Adiasih
title Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia
title_short Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia
title_full Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia
title_fullStr Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia
title_full_unstemmed Manajemen Laba Pada Saat Pergantian CEO (Dirut) Di Indonesia
title_sort manajemen laba pada saat pergantian ceo (dirut) di indonesia
publisher Petra Christian University
series Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
issn 1411-0288
publishDate 2011-09-01
description This study investigates earnings management of CEO changes in Indonesia. CEO change is classified either as routine or non-routine based on RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) and RUPSLB (Extraordinary General Shareholders Meeting) information. The samples are listed company undergoing CEO changes in the Indonesian Stock Market observed from 2000 to 2009. To identify the earnings management practice, modified Jones model of discretionary accruals and Rowchordory’ of real earnings management are employed. The study provides evidence of non-routine incoming CEO undertaking earnings management by minimizing the earnings in the year of CEO change. The evidence shows that reporting minimum earnings is consistent with the notion of new CEO’s engagement in an ‘earnings bath’. However, this study does not support the theory of management compensation contracts during routine CEO changes. In addition, the incumbent CEO in the non-routine changes does not practice earnings management in the final year before the change. Therefore, manipulating earnings is not the argument to a non routine change of CEO.
topic Earnings management
discretionary accruals
routine and non-routine CEO changes.
url http://puslit2.petra.ac.id/ejournal/index.php/aku/article/view/18458
work_keys_str_mv AT priskilaadiasih manajemenlabapadasaatpergantianceodirutdiindonesia
AT indrawijayakusuma manajemenlabapadasaatpergantianceodirutdiindonesia
_version_ 1716783146187358208