Backward Induction for Repeated Games

We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion of 'topologically compact' nondeter...

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Main Author: Jules Hedges
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2018-07-01
Series:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.07074v2
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spelling doaj-123c645575554e0b89942656f27a937a2020-11-25T01:18:00ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802018-07-01275Proc. MSFP 2018355210.4204/EPTCS.275.5:6Backward Induction for Repeated GamesJules Hedges0 University of Oxford We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion of 'topologically compact' nondeterminism, and a simple model of computable real numbers. This is the first application of Escardó and Oliva's theory of higher-order sequential games to games of imperfect information, in which (as well as its mathematical elegance) lazy evaluation does nontrivial work for us compared with a traditional game-theoretic analysis. Since a full theoretical understanding of this method is lacking (and appears to be very hard), we consider this an 'experimental' paper heavily inspired by theoretical ideas. We use the famous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as a worked example.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.07074v2
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jules Hedges
spellingShingle Jules Hedges
Backward Induction for Repeated Games
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
author_facet Jules Hedges
author_sort Jules Hedges
title Backward Induction for Repeated Games
title_short Backward Induction for Repeated Games
title_full Backward Induction for Repeated Games
title_fullStr Backward Induction for Repeated Games
title_full_unstemmed Backward Induction for Repeated Games
title_sort backward induction for repeated games
publisher Open Publishing Association
series Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
issn 2075-2180
publishDate 2018-07-01
description We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion of 'topologically compact' nondeterminism, and a simple model of computable real numbers. This is the first application of Escardó and Oliva's theory of higher-order sequential games to games of imperfect information, in which (as well as its mathematical elegance) lazy evaluation does nontrivial work for us compared with a traditional game-theoretic analysis. Since a full theoretical understanding of this method is lacking (and appears to be very hard), we consider this an 'experimental' paper heavily inspired by theoretical ideas. We use the famous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as a worked example.
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.07074v2
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