Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Felix Albrecht, Sebastian Kube
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2018-07-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
peer punishment
strategy method
type classification
public goods game
coordination game
weakest link game
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/54
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spelling doaj-1066e8c7f472446689b403accf2320432020-11-24T22:22:57ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362018-07-01935410.3390/g9030054g9030054Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination GameFelix Albrecht0Sebastian Kube1Economics Department, University of Marburg, Universitätsstraße 25, D-35037 Marburg, GermanyInstitute for Applied Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, GermanyWe elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/54peer punishmentstrategy methodtype classificationpublic goods gamecoordination gameweakest link game
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Felix Albrecht
Sebastian Kube
spellingShingle Felix Albrecht
Sebastian Kube
Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
Games
peer punishment
strategy method
type classification
public goods game
coordination game
weakest link game
author_facet Felix Albrecht
Sebastian Kube
author_sort Felix Albrecht
title Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
title_short Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
title_full Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
title_fullStr Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
title_full_unstemmed Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
title_sort peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
publisher MDPI AG
series Games
issn 2073-4336
publishDate 2018-07-01
description We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.
topic peer punishment
strategy method
type classification
public goods game
coordination game
weakest link game
url http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/54
work_keys_str_mv AT felixalbrecht peerpunishmentinacooperationandacoordinationgame
AT sebastiankube peerpunishmentinacooperationandacoordinationgame
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