Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2018-07-01
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| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/54 |
| Summary: | We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments. |
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| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |