Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance
Collusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hidde...
Main Authors: | Qiang Wei, Xinyu Gou, Tianyu Deng, Chunguang Bai |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Hindawi-Wiley
2021-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5554501 |
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