Game-theoretic model of coordinations of interests at innovative development of corporations

• Main Authors: Gennady Anatolievich Ougolnitsky, Anatoly B. Usov
• Format: Article
• Language: Russian
• Published: Institute of Computer Science 2016-08-01
• Series: Компьютерные исследования и моделирование
• Subjects: Germeyer’s game; Shtakelberg’s game; hierarchy; simulation modeling; innovative development; compulsion; impulsion
• Online Access: http://crm.ics.org.ru/uploads/crmissues/crm_2016_4/16.08.07.pdf
• ISSN: 2076-7633; 2077-6853

Dynamic game theoretic models of the corporative innovative development are investigated. The proposed models are based on concordance of private and public interests of agents. It is supposed that the structure of interests of each agent includes both private (personal interests) and public (interests of the whole company connected with its innovative development first) components. The agents allocate their personal resources between these two directions. The system dynamics is described by a difference (not differential) equation. The proposed model of innovative development is studied by simulation and the method of enumeration of the domains of feasible controls with a constant step. The main contribution of the paper consists in comparative analysis of efficiency of the methods of hierarchical control (compulsion or impulsion) for information structures of Stackelberg or Germeier (four structures) by means of the indices of system compatibility. The proposed model is a universal one and can be used for a scientifically grounded support of the programs of innovative development of any economic firm. The features of a specific company are considered in the process of model identification (a determination of the specific classes of model functions and numerical values of its parameters) which forms a separate complex problem and requires an analysis of the statistical data and expert estimations. The following assumptions about information rules of the hierarchical game are accepted: all players use open-loop strategies; the leader chooses and reports to the followers some values of administrative (compulsion) or economic (impulsion) control variables which can be only functions of time (Stackelberg games) or depend also on the followers controls (Germeier games); given the leaders strategies all followers simultaneously and independently choose their strategies that gives a Nash equilibrium in the followers game. For a finite number of iterations the proposed algorithm of simulation modeling allows to build an approximate solution of the model or to conclude that it doesnt exist. A reliability and efficiency of the proposed algorithm follow from the properties of the scenario method and the method of a direct ordered enumeration with a constant step. Some comprehensive conclusions about the comparative efficiency of methods of hierarchical control of innovations are received.