Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?

We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game, the computer was nevertheless optimizing against som...

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Main Authors: Sujata Ghosh, Aviad Heifetz, Rineke Verbrugge
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2016-06-01
Series:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.07521v1
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spelling doaj-0a8b2f7e19c6456099900de1a4ebe6f32020-11-24T23:33:07ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802016-06-01215Proc. TARK 201515917510.4204/EPTCS.215.12:11Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?Sujata Ghosh0Aviad Heifetz1Rineke Verbrugge2 Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai, India The Open University of Israel, Raanana, Israel University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game, the computer was nevertheless optimizing against some belief about the participant's future strategy. It turned out that in the aggregate, participants were likely to respond in a way which is optimal with respect to their best-rationalization extensive form rationalizability conjecture - namely the conjecture that the computer is after a larger prize than the one it has foregone, even when this necessarily meant that the computer has attributed future irrationality to the participant when the computer made the first move in the game. Thus, it appeared that participants applied forward induction. However, there exist alternative explanations for the choices of most participants; for example, choices could be based on the extent of risk aversion that participants attributed to the computer in the remainder of the game, rather than to the sunk outside option that the computer has already foregone at the beginning of the game. For this reason, the results of the experiment do not yet provide conclusive evidence for Forward Induction reasoning on the part of the participants.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.07521v1
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Sujata Ghosh
Aviad Heifetz
Rineke Verbrugge
spellingShingle Sujata Ghosh
Aviad Heifetz
Rineke Verbrugge
Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
author_facet Sujata Ghosh
Aviad Heifetz
Rineke Verbrugge
author_sort Sujata Ghosh
title Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
title_short Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
title_full Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
title_fullStr Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
title_full_unstemmed Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
title_sort do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
publisher Open Publishing Association
series Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
issn 2075-2180
publishDate 2016-06-01
description We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game, the computer was nevertheless optimizing against some belief about the participant's future strategy. It turned out that in the aggregate, participants were likely to respond in a way which is optimal with respect to their best-rationalization extensive form rationalizability conjecture - namely the conjecture that the computer is after a larger prize than the one it has foregone, even when this necessarily meant that the computer has attributed future irrationality to the participant when the computer made the first move in the game. Thus, it appeared that participants applied forward induction. However, there exist alternative explanations for the choices of most participants; for example, choices could be based on the extent of risk aversion that participants attributed to the computer in the remainder of the game, rather than to the sunk outside option that the computer has already foregone at the beginning of the game. For this reason, the results of the experiment do not yet provide conclusive evidence for Forward Induction reasoning on the part of the participants.
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.07521v1
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