New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model
There has been a major shift in research on human reasoning towards Bayesian and probabilistic approaches, which has been called a new paradigm. The new paradigm sees most everyday and scientific reasoning as taking place in a context of uncertainty, and inference is from uncertain beliefs and not f...
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doaj-09bea48c04bb447aa599336c625842702020-11-24T23:49:57ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782014-04-01510.3389/fpsyg.2014.0031674413New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source ModelHenrik eSingmann0Karl Christoph Klauer1David E Over2Albert-Ludwigs-Universität FreiburgAlbert-Ludwigs-Universität FreiburgDurham UniversityThere has been a major shift in research on human reasoning towards Bayesian and probabilistic approaches, which has been called a new paradigm. The new paradigm sees most everyday and scientific reasoning as taking place in a context of uncertainty, and inference is from uncertain beliefs and not from arbitrary assumptions. In this manuscript we present an empirical test of normative standards in the new paradigm using a novel probabilized conditional reasoning task. Our results indicated that for everyday conditional with at least a weak causal connection between antecedent and consequent only the conditional probability of the consequent given antecedent contributes unique variance to predicting the probability of conditional, but not the probability of the conjunction, nor the probability of the material conditional. Regarding normative accounts of reasoning, we found significant evidence that participants' responses were confidence preserving (i.e., p-valid in the sense of Adams, 1998) for MP inferences, but not for MT inferences. Additionally, only for MP inferences and to a lesser degree for DA inferences did the rate of responses inside the coherence intervals defined by mental probability logic (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005, 2010) exceed chance levels. In contrast to the normative accounts, the dual-source model (Klauer, Beller, & Hütter, 2010) is a descriptive model. It posits that participants integrate their background knowledge (i.e., the type of information primary to the normative approaches) and their subjective probability that a conclusion is seen as warranted based on its logical form. Model fits showed that the dual-source model, which employed participants' responses to a deductive task with abstract contents to estimate the form-based component, provided as good an account of the data as a model that solely used data from the probabilized conditional reasoning task.<br/>http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00316/fullrationalitycoherencemixed modelsConditional reasoningProbabilistic reasoningnew paradigm psychology of reasoning |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Henrik eSingmann Karl Christoph Klauer David E Over |
spellingShingle |
Henrik eSingmann Karl Christoph Klauer David E Over New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model Frontiers in Psychology rationality coherence mixed models Conditional reasoning Probabilistic reasoning new paradigm psychology of reasoning |
author_facet |
Henrik eSingmann Karl Christoph Klauer David E Over |
author_sort |
Henrik eSingmann |
title |
New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model |
title_short |
New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model |
title_full |
New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model |
title_fullStr |
New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model |
title_full_unstemmed |
New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model |
title_sort |
new normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model |
publisher |
Frontiers Media S.A. |
series |
Frontiers in Psychology |
issn |
1664-1078 |
publishDate |
2014-04-01 |
description |
There has been a major shift in research on human reasoning towards Bayesian and probabilistic approaches, which has been called a new paradigm. The new paradigm sees most everyday and scientific reasoning as taking place in a context of uncertainty, and inference is from uncertain beliefs and not from arbitrary assumptions. In this manuscript we present an empirical test of normative standards in the new paradigm using a novel probabilized conditional reasoning task. Our results indicated that for everyday conditional with at least a weak causal connection between antecedent and consequent only the conditional probability of the consequent given antecedent contributes unique variance to predicting the probability of conditional, but not the probability of the conjunction, nor the probability of the material conditional. Regarding normative accounts of reasoning, we found significant evidence that participants' responses were confidence preserving (i.e., p-valid in the sense of Adams, 1998) for MP inferences, but not for MT inferences. Additionally, only for MP inferences and to a lesser degree for DA inferences did the rate of responses inside the coherence intervals defined by mental probability logic (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005, 2010) exceed chance levels. In contrast to the normative accounts, the dual-source model (Klauer, Beller, & Hütter, 2010) is a descriptive model. It posits that participants integrate their background knowledge (i.e., the type of information primary to the normative approaches) and their subjective probability that a conclusion is seen as warranted based on its logical form. Model fits showed that the dual-source model, which employed participants' responses to a deductive task with abstract contents to estimate the form-based component, provided as good an account of the data as a model that solely used data from the probabilized conditional reasoning task.<br/> |
topic |
rationality coherence mixed models Conditional reasoning Probabilistic reasoning new paradigm psychology of reasoning |
url |
http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00316/full |
work_keys_str_mv |
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