Naturalistic Moral Realism
The subject of this paper is probably the most influential version of moral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be i...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
2005-12-01
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| Series: | Prolegomena |
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| Online Access: | http://www.hrstud.hr/prolegomena/Pro-2005-2/Pro-2005-2-Cl-Susnik.pdf |
| Summary: | The subject of this paper is probably the most influential version of moral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknown Mackie’s “argument from querness” (or at least one version of that argument). In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties. |
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| ISSN: | 1333-4395 1846-0593 |