Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns
Why do parties and candidates decide to go negative? Research usually starts from the assumption that this decision is strategic, and within this framework two elements stand out: the prospect of electoral failure increases the use of negative campaigning, and so does time pressure (little reaming t...
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doaj-06e22a4e35e845dba863a544175cef6f2020-11-25T01:55:15ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632019-06-017227829610.17645/pag.v7i2.19401072Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum CampaignsAlessandro Nai0Ferran Martínez i Coma1Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam, The NetherlandsGriffith Business School, Griffith University, AustraliaWhy do parties and candidates decide to go negative? Research usually starts from the assumption that this decision is strategic, and within this framework two elements stand out: the prospect of electoral failure increases the use of negative campaigning, and so does time pressure (little reaming time to convince voters before election day). In this article, we contribute to this framework by testing two new expectations: (i) political actors are more likely to go negative when they face unfavourable competitive standings and voting day is near; and (ii) they are less likely to go negative when they faced a substantive degradation in their competitive standing over the course of the campaign. We test these expectations on a rich database of newspaper ads about national referenda in Switzerland and provide preliminary empirical evidence consistent with those expectations. The results have important implications for existing research on the strategic underpinnings of campaigning and political communication.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1940anxietyadvertisement timingcompetitive standingdirect democracypollsstrategic behaviourSwitzerlandnegative campaigning |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Alessandro Nai Ferran Martínez i Coma |
spellingShingle |
Alessandro Nai Ferran Martínez i Coma Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns Politics and Governance anxiety advertisement timing competitive standing direct democracy polls strategic behaviour Switzerland negative campaigning |
author_facet |
Alessandro Nai Ferran Martínez i Coma |
author_sort |
Alessandro Nai |
title |
Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns |
title_short |
Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns |
title_full |
Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns |
title_fullStr |
Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns |
title_full_unstemmed |
Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns |
title_sort |
losing in the polls, time pressure, and the decision to go negative in referendum campaigns |
publisher |
Cogitatio |
series |
Politics and Governance |
issn |
2183-2463 |
publishDate |
2019-06-01 |
description |
Why do parties and candidates decide to go negative? Research usually starts from the assumption that this decision is strategic, and within this framework two elements stand out: the prospect of electoral failure increases the use of negative campaigning, and so does time pressure (little reaming time to convince voters before election day). In this article, we contribute to this framework by testing two new expectations: (i) political actors are more likely to go negative when they face unfavourable competitive standings and voting day is near; and (ii) they are less likely to go negative when they faced a substantive degradation in their competitive standing over the course of the campaign. We test these expectations on a rich database of newspaper ads about national referenda in Switzerland and provide preliminary empirical evidence consistent with those expectations. The results have important implications for existing research on the strategic underpinnings of campaigning and political communication. |
topic |
anxiety advertisement timing competitive standing direct democracy polls strategic behaviour Switzerland negative campaigning |
url |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1940 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT alessandronai losinginthepollstimepressureandthedecisiontogonegativeinreferendumcampaigns AT ferranmartinezicoma losinginthepollstimepressureandthedecisiontogonegativeinreferendumcampaigns |
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