How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?

Given the vital role of independent directors in determination of executives’ compensation, we explore how independent directors view the CEO pay disparity. Using the data of all companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges for the period 2005 to 2015, we find that the proportion...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Shagufta Jafar, Muhammad Usman
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Johar Education Society 2019-03-01
Series:Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.jespk.net/publications/4329.pdf
id doaj-064c624c896b4c94860c231a00024218
record_format Article
spelling doaj-064c624c896b4c94860c231a000242182020-11-25T04:03:14ZengJohar Education SocietyPakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences1997-85532309-86192019-03-0113195103How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China? Shagufta Jafar 0Muhammad Usman 1Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, P.R. ChinaDivision of Computational Mathematics and Engineering, Institute for Computational Science, Ton Duc Thang University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Faculty of Finance and Banking, Ton Duc Thang University, Ho Chi Minh City, VietnamGiven the vital role of independent directors in determination of executives’ compensation, we explore how independent directors view the CEO pay disparity. Using the data of all companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges for the period 2005 to 2015, we find that the proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively associated with the extent to which executives’ pay is dispersed. This finding suggests that independent directors view the dispersion of the CEO’s and other executive directors’ pay from the managerial power theory perspective rather than from the tournament theory.http://www.jespk.net/publications/4329.pdfceo pay disparityceo tenurechinaindependent directorsmanagerial powerand state owned firmstournament incentives
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Shagufta Jafar
Muhammad Usman
spellingShingle Shagufta Jafar
Muhammad Usman
How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?
Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences
ceo pay disparity
ceo tenure
china
independent directors
managerial power
and state owned firms
tournament incentives
author_facet Shagufta Jafar
Muhammad Usman
author_sort Shagufta Jafar
title How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?
title_short How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?
title_full How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?
title_fullStr How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?
title_full_unstemmed How Do Independent Directors View CEO Pay Disparity in China?
title_sort how do independent directors view ceo pay disparity in china?
publisher Johar Education Society
series Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences
issn 1997-8553
2309-8619
publishDate 2019-03-01
description Given the vital role of independent directors in determination of executives’ compensation, we explore how independent directors view the CEO pay disparity. Using the data of all companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges for the period 2005 to 2015, we find that the proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively associated with the extent to which executives’ pay is dispersed. This finding suggests that independent directors view the dispersion of the CEO’s and other executive directors’ pay from the managerial power theory perspective rather than from the tournament theory.
topic ceo pay disparity
ceo tenure
china
independent directors
managerial power
and state owned firms
tournament incentives
url http://www.jespk.net/publications/4329.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT shaguftajafar howdoindependentdirectorsviewceopaydisparityinchina
AT muhammadusman howdoindependentdirectorsviewceopaydisparityinchina
_version_ 1724441062736396288