Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank
Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European C...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wrocław University of Science and Technology
2013-01-01
|
| Series: | Operations Research and Decisions |
| Online Access: | http://orduser.pwr.wroc.pl/DownloadFile.aspx?aid=1054 |
| id |
doaj-04d41901489d4ab6bce9d7a012dff88d |
|---|---|
| record_format |
Article |
| spelling |
doaj-04d41901489d4ab6bce9d7a012dff88d2020-11-24T23:37:58ZengWrocław University of Science and TechnologyOperations Research and Decisions2081-88582391-60602013-01-01vol. 23no. 17586171252399Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central BankHonorata Sosnowska0Warsaw School of Economics, PolandGame theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes. (original abstract)http://orduser.pwr.wroc.pl/DownloadFile.aspx?aid=1054 |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Honorata Sosnowska |
| spellingShingle |
Honorata Sosnowska Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank Operations Research and Decisions |
| author_facet |
Honorata Sosnowska |
| author_sort |
Honorata Sosnowska |
| title |
Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank |
| title_short |
Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank |
| title_full |
Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank |
| title_fullStr |
Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Analysis of the Voting Method used in the European Central Bank |
| title_sort |
analysis of the voting method used in the european central bank |
| publisher |
Wrocław University of Science and Technology |
| series |
Operations Research and Decisions |
| issn |
2081-8858 2391-6060 |
| publishDate |
2013-01-01 |
| description |
Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes. (original abstract) |
| url |
http://orduser.pwr.wroc.pl/DownloadFile.aspx?aid=1054 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT honoratasosnowska analysisofthevotingmethodusedintheeuropeancentralbank |
| _version_ |
1725518302661312512 |