Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer

Compared with the traditional agri-food supply chain (AFSC) whose only goal is to maximize economic benefits, the sustainable agri-food supply chain (SAFSC) starts to attract more attention. Typical challenges faced by SAFSC development are unfair pricing of produce, yield uncertainty caused by adve...

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Main Authors: Hongyong Fu, Kok Loy Teo, Yujie Li, Lei Wang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2018-12-01
Series:Sustainability
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/12/4540
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spelling doaj-02ade6592c3a472681b493a226e20a992020-11-25T00:13:13ZengMDPI AGSustainability2071-10502018-12-011012454010.3390/su10124540su10124540Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse FarmerHongyong Fu0Kok Loy Teo1Yujie Li2Lei Wang3China Research Institute of Enterprise Governed by Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Computing and Mathematical Science, Curtin University, 6845 Perth, AustraliaChina Research Institute of Enterprise Governed by Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, ChinaChina Research Institute of Enterprise Governed by Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, ChinaCompared with the traditional agri-food supply chain (AFSC) whose only goal is to maximize economic benefits, the sustainable agri-food supply chain (SAFSC) starts to attract more attention. Typical challenges faced by SAFSC development are unfair pricing of produce, yield uncertainty caused by adverse weather, as well as conflict and cooperation between stakeholders and sustainable activities of SAFSC. In this paper, we establish a two-echelon decision-making model consisting of a loss-averse farmer and a loss-neutral company. A guaranteed price mechanism is contrived to mitigate the effects of uncertain procurement price on the farmers’ profit. It is found that this mechanism can improve the sustainable investment level but fails to reach the optimal level of the SAFSC system. Thus, a risk⁻reward contract taking into account the weather index (temperature) and the degree of loss aversion is designed. Results show that this contract can settle the distortion of the sustainable investment level and effectively motivate farmers to participate in the sustainable agricultural practice. Furthermore, we derive the conditions on the contract parameters under which both the company and the farmer are motivated to exert efforts to stand by sustainable agricultural practice.https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/12/4540sustainable supply chainsustainable agri-food supply chainweather riskloss-averse preferencerisk–reward contractcoordination
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Hongyong Fu
Kok Loy Teo
Yujie Li
Lei Wang
spellingShingle Hongyong Fu
Kok Loy Teo
Yujie Li
Lei Wang
Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer
Sustainability
sustainable supply chain
sustainable agri-food supply chain
weather risk
loss-averse preference
risk–reward contract
coordination
author_facet Hongyong Fu
Kok Loy Teo
Yujie Li
Lei Wang
author_sort Hongyong Fu
title Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer
title_short Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer
title_full Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer
title_fullStr Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer
title_full_unstemmed Weather Risk–Reward Contract for Sustainable Agri-Food Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Farmer
title_sort weather risk–reward contract for sustainable agri-food supply chain with loss-averse farmer
publisher MDPI AG
series Sustainability
issn 2071-1050
publishDate 2018-12-01
description Compared with the traditional agri-food supply chain (AFSC) whose only goal is to maximize economic benefits, the sustainable agri-food supply chain (SAFSC) starts to attract more attention. Typical challenges faced by SAFSC development are unfair pricing of produce, yield uncertainty caused by adverse weather, as well as conflict and cooperation between stakeholders and sustainable activities of SAFSC. In this paper, we establish a two-echelon decision-making model consisting of a loss-averse farmer and a loss-neutral company. A guaranteed price mechanism is contrived to mitigate the effects of uncertain procurement price on the farmers’ profit. It is found that this mechanism can improve the sustainable investment level but fails to reach the optimal level of the SAFSC system. Thus, a risk⁻reward contract taking into account the weather index (temperature) and the degree of loss aversion is designed. Results show that this contract can settle the distortion of the sustainable investment level and effectively motivate farmers to participate in the sustainable agricultural practice. Furthermore, we derive the conditions on the contract parameters under which both the company and the farmer are motivated to exert efforts to stand by sustainable agricultural practice.
topic sustainable supply chain
sustainable agri-food supply chain
weather risk
loss-averse preference
risk–reward contract
coordination
url https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/12/4540
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AT yujieli weatherriskrewardcontractforsustainableagrifoodsupplychainwithlossaversefarmer
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