A Strong Mutual Authentication Protocol for SHIELD

• Main Authors: OZCANHAN, M. H., TURKSONMEZ, H.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Stefan cel Mare University of Suceava 2020-11-01
• Series: Advances in Electrical and Computer Engineering
• Subjects: access control; authentication; computer security; integrated circuits; radiofrequency identification
• Online Access: http://dx.doi.org/10.4316/AECE.2020.04010

Study shows that counterfeit semiconductors or Integrated Circuits (ICs) are increasingly penetrating into advanced electronic defense systems. Traditional supply chain management policies have been found unsuccessful in protecting the IC supply chain. Our study demonstrates that the newly started threat mitigation initiative of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) scheme has not matured yet, and the proposed authentication protocol improvements are still vulnerable to known non-invasive, side-channel attacks. In present work, a novel authentication protocol based on strong mutual authentication is proposed, which resists the demonstrated attacks on previous schemes. The security and performance comparison with the previous work is provided, to inform the IC community about the seriousness of the weaknesses, in previous works. The comparison results show that our proposed protocol exchanges more information, uses more memory and makes more encryption computations. Thus, although our proposed scheme consumes more energy, it has the security required by SHIELD. The outcome forces IC producers to provide enough memory and processing power in a small die area, if the electronic defense IC supply chain is to have the expected security.