A Simple Coase-Like Mechanism that Transfers Control of Government Spending Levels from Politicians to Voters
Main Author: | Philip E. Graves |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
De Gruyter
2007-03-01
|
Series: | Economics : the Open-Access, Open-Assessment e-Journal |
Online Access: | http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-12 |
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