Vers un fondement psychologique transcendantal des sciences

The posterity remembers the criticism of Dilthey’s relativism in Husserl’s « Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft » (Logos 1910/11). However, the progressive publication of non-edited works of both philosophers gives place for some revision. Particularly, the study of Dilthey’s psychological works o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Wioletta Miskiewicz
Format: Article
Language:fra
Published: Université de Lille 2004-04-01
Series:Methodos
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journals.openedition.org/methodos/63
Description
Summary:The posterity remembers the criticism of Dilthey’s relativism in Husserl’s « Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft » (Logos 1910/11). However, the progressive publication of non-edited works of both philosophers gives place for some revision. Particularly, the study of Dilthey’s psychological works opens a perspective, which discloses the veritable epistemological dimension for the possible exchange between some of Dilthey’s and Husserl’s ideas : the abandonment of body/mind dualism and of the topological structure interior/exterior in psychology. Connected with Dilthey’s tournant gnoséologique, these problems of foundation of sciences throw a new and unexpected light on the transcendentalism of Husserl.
ISSN:1769-7379